

# Discover[i]

Component-based  
Parameterized Reasoning for  
Distributed Systems



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Tiark  
Rompf



Roopsha  
Samanta



Xiangyu  
Zhang

## Research Agenda

Make it easier to write reliable programs using automated reasoning

Formal methods

Programming languages

Program repair

Program synthesis

Program verification

Concurrent systems


Distributed systems

Personalized education

Machine learning

# Cost-Aware Program Repair

```
Power(int x, int i){  
  if (i<=2)  
    if (i=0)  
      return 0  
    elseif (i=1)  
      return x  
  else  
    return pow(x,i)  
}
```



$i \geq 0 \rightarrow \text{Power}(x, i) = x^i$

# Cost-Aware Program Repair

Syntactic + semantic  
program distances


```
Power(int x, int i){  
  if (i<=2)  
    if (i=0)  
      return 0  
    elseif (i=1)  
      return x  
  else  
    return pow(x,i)  
}
```

Repair  
Engine


```
Power(int x, int i){  
  if (i<=2)  
    if (i=0)  
      return 1  
    elseif (i=1)  
      return x  
  else  
    return pow(x,i)  
}
```

$i \geq 0 \rightarrow \text{Power}(x, i) = x^i$


# Program Clustering with Quantitative Semantic Features




# Neural Network Repair



# Neural Network Repair



# Neural Network Repair



# Augmented example-based synthesis

Partial program


```
int max(int x, int y, int z){  
  int m = ??v;  
  if (??e) m = ??v;  
  if (??e) m = ??v;  
  return m;  
}
```

(a)

Example set  $E$

```
( 0, 10, 2) ⇒ 10;  
(-1, 10, 20) ⇒ 20;  
(-1, -2, -3) ⇒ -1;
```

SKETCH



Synthesized program

```
int max(int x, int y, int z) {  
  int m = x;  
  if(y < z) m = z;  
  if(m < y) m = y;  
  return m;  
}
```


(b)



Augmented example set

```
( 0, 10, 2) ⇒ 10; (-1, 10, 20) ⇒ 20; (-1, -2, -3) ⇒ -1;  
( 0, 2, 10) ⇒ 10; (-1, 20, 10) ⇒ 20; (-1, -3, -2) ⇒ -1;  
(10, 0, 2) ⇒ 10; (10, -1, 20) ⇒ 20; (-2, -1, -3) ⇒ -1;  
(10, 2, 0) ⇒ 10; (10, 20, -1) ⇒ 20; (-2, -3, -1) ⇒ -1;  
( 2, 0, 10) ⇒ 10; (20, -1, 10) ⇒ 20; (-3, -1, -2) ⇒ -1;  
( 2, 10, 0) ⇒ 10; (20, 10, -1) ⇒ 20; (-3, -2, -1) ⇒ -1;
```

SKETCH



Synthesized program

```
int max(int x, int y, int z) {  
  int m = z;  
  if(z ≤ y) m = y;  
  if(m < x) m = x;  
  return m;  
}
```

(c)



# Synchronization Synthesis for Concurrent Programs

```
void open_dev()  
  if (open==0)  
    power_up();  
  open := open+1;  
  yield;
```

```
void close_dev()  
  if (open>0)  
    open := open-1;  
  if (open==0)  
    power_down();  
  yield;
```

Synchronization  
Synthesizer

Preemption-safety

```
void open_dev()  
  lock(1)  
  if (open==0)  
    power_up();  
  open := open+1;  
  unlock(1)  
  yield;
```

```
void close_dev()  
  lock(1)  
  if (open>0)  
    open := open-1;  
  if (open==0)  
    power_down();  
  unlock(1)  
  yield;
```

# Discover[i]



Nouraldin  
Jaber




Swen  
Jacobs




Milind  
Kulkarni



Roopsha  
Samanta





# What makes building correct distributed systems hard?

Complex building blocks



# What makes building correct distributed systems hard?

Complex building blocks



Consensus

Atomic commit

Reliable broadcast

...

# What makes building correct distributed systems hard?

Complex building blocks



Consensus


[Sergey et al. 2018]  
[Padon et al. 2016]  
[Dragoi et al. 2016]  
[Hawblitzel et al. 2015]  
[Wilcox et al. 2015]  
[Cousineau et al. 2012]  
[Lamport 2002]

# What makes building correct distributed systems hard?

Complex building blocks



Arbitrary number of processes




Parameterized verification  
is undecidable

# What makes building correct distributed systems hard?

Complex building blocks



Arbitrary number of processes



Programmer errors



Too many moving parts!


# Discover[i]

## Challenges

Complex building blocks



Arbitrary number of processes



Programmer errors




# Discover[i]

## Challenges

Complex building blocks



Arbitrary number of processes



Programmer errors



## Solutions

Abstractions


# Discover[i]

## Challenges

Complex building blocks



Arbitrary number of processes



Programmer errors



## Solutions

Abstractions

Parameterized verification


# Discover[i]

## Challenges


Complex building blocks



Arbitrary number of processes



Programmer errors



## Solutions

Abstractions

Parameterized verification


Parameterized synthesis

# Discover[i]


Distributed protocols with consensus components



Abstractions




Parameterized verification




Parameterized synthesis

- ▶ **System model:** Distributed protocols
- ▶ **Properties:** LTL
- ▶ **Failures:** No process or channel failures
- ▶ **Communication:** Instantaneous


# Basic protocols




Identical FSMs



# Basic protocols



||




Identical FSMs

Interleaving semantics





# Basic protocols




Identical FSMs

Interleaving semantics


||



# Basic protocols




||




Identical FSMs

Interleaving semantics

Broadcasts  
Peer-to-peer




# Basic protocols




Identical FSMs

Interleaving semantics

Broadcasts  
Peer-to-peer




# Basic protocols




Identical FSMs

Interleaving semantics

Broadcasts  
Peer-to-peer



# Basic protocols




Identical FSMs

Interleaving semantics

Broadcasts  
Peer-to-peer

Guarded commands



No process/channel failures  
Instantaneous message delivery  
LTL properties

Consensus  
protocol



```
cons( )
```

Consensus  
protocol

Participants

`cons({1,2,4})`

Consensus  
protocol

Participants

`cons({1, 2, 4}, 2)`

Cardinality

Consensus  
protocol

Participants

$$\text{cons}(\{1, 2, 4\}, 2) = \{1, 2\}$$

Cardinality

Winners

Consensus  
protocol

Participants

$\text{cons}(\{1, 2, 4\}, 2) = \{\{1, 2\}, \{1, 4\}, \{2, 4\}\}$

Cardinality

Winners



`cons({1,2,4},2) = {{1,2},{1,4},{2,4}}`




```

On (Leader, L, n):
  if n > nL:
    leader := L, nL := n
    if self = L and nL > nprom:
      state := (leader, prepare)
      propCmds = (); las := [0]N; lds := [⊥]N
      acks := [⊥]N; lc := 0;
      send (Prepare, nL, ld, na) to all π - {self}
      acks[L] := (na, suffix(va, ld))
      lds[self] := ld; nprom := nL
    else:
      state = (follower, state[2])

On (Prepare, nL, ld, n) from L:
  if nprom < nL:
    nprom := nL; state := (follower, prepare)
    suffix := if na ≥ n: suffix(va, ld) else ⊙
    send (Promise, nL, na, suffix, ld) to L

acks[a] := (na, suffixa), lds[a] := ld
P := {p in π : acks[p] ≠ ⊥}
if |P| = [(N+1)/2]:
  (k, suffix) := max({acks[p]: p in P}) // adopt v
  va = prefix(va, ld) + suffix + propCmds;
  las[self] := |va|
  propCmds := ⊙; state := (leader, accept)
  for p in π - {self} and lds[p] ≠ ⊥:
    suffix := suffix(va, lds[p])
    send (AcceptSync, nL, suffix, lds[p]) to p

On (Promise, n, na, suffixa, ld) from a
  s.t. n = nL and state = (leader, accept):
    lds[a] := ld
    send (AcceptSync, nL, suffix(va, lds[a]), lds[a]) to a
  if lc ≠ 0:
    send (Decide, ld, nL) to a
  
```



$$\text{cons}(\{1, 2, 4\}, 2) = \{\{1, 2\}, \{1, 4\}, \{2, 4\}\}$$




```

On (Leader, L, n):
  if n > ni:
    leader := L; ni := n
    if self = L and ni > nmax:
      state := (leader, prepare)
      propCmds := (); lcs := [0]n; lds := [1]n
      acks := [⊥]n; lc := 0;
      send (Prepare, ni, lc, na) to all π - {self}
      acks[L] := (ni, suffix(va, lc))
      lds[self] := lc; nmax := ni
    else:
      state := (follower, state[2])

On (Prepare, ni, lc, n) from L:
  if nmax < ni:
    nmax := ni; state := (follower, prepare)
    suffix := if na ≥ n: suffix(va, lc) else ()
    send (Promise, ni, na, suffix, lc) to L

acks[a] := (na, suffixa); lds[a] := ld
P := {p in π : acks[p] ≠ ⊥}
if |P| = [(N+1)/2]:
  (k, suffix) := max({acks[p]; p in P}) // adopt v
  va := prefix(va, ld) + suffix + propCmds;
  lcs[self] := va
  propCmds := (); state := (leader, accept)
  for p in π - {self} and lds[p] ≠ ⊥:
    suffix := suffix(va, lds[p])
    send (AcceptSync, ni, suffix, lds[p]) to p


On (Promise, n, na, suffixa, ld) from a
s.t. n = ni and state = (leader, accept):
  lds[a] := ld
  send (AcceptSync, ni, suffix(va, lds[a]), lds[a]) to a
  if lc ≠ 0:
    send (Decide, lc, ni) to a
  
```



Primitive

+

Specification



$$\text{cons}(\{1, 2, 4\}, 2) = \{\{1, 2\}, \{1, 4\}, \{2, 4\}\}$$




```

On (Leader, L, n):
  if n > ni:
    leader := L, ni := n
    if self = L and ni > nmax:
      state := (leader, prepare)
      propCmds := (); lcs := [0]n; lds := [1]n
      acks := [Δ]n; lc := 0;
      send (Prepare, ni, lc, na) to all π - {self}
      acks[L] := (ni, suffix(va, lc))
      lds[self] := lc; nmax := ni
    else:
      state := (follower, state[2])

On (Prepare, ni, lc, n) from L:
  if nmax < ni:
    nmax := ni; state := (follower, prepare)
    suffix := if na ≥ n: suffix(va, lc) else ()
    send (Promise, ni, np, suffix, la) to L

acks[a] := (np, suffixa), lds[a] := ld
P := {p in π : acks[p] ≠ Δ}
if |P| = [(N+1)/2]:
  (k, suffix) := max({acks[p]: p in P}) // adopt v
  va = prefix(va, lc) + suffix + propCmds;
  lcs[self] := va
  propCmds := (); state := (leader, accept)
  for p in π - {self} and lds[p] ≠ Δ:
    suffix := suffix(va, lds[p])
    send (AcceptSync, ni, suffix, lds[p]) to p

On (Promise, n, np, suffixa, ld) from a
  s.t. n = ni and state = (leader, accept):
    lds[a] := ld
    send (AcceptSync, ni, suffix(va, lds[a]), lds[a]) to a
  if lc ≠ 0:
    send (Decide, lc, ni) to a
  
```




choose

Primitive

+

Specification



- ▶ Consistent Participants
- ▶ Consistent Winners

$$\text{cons}(\{1, 2, 4\}, 2) = \{\{1, 2\}, \{1, 4\}, \{2, 4\}\}$$




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On (Leader, L, n):
  if n > nl:
    leader := L, nl := n
    if self = L and nl > nmax:
      state := (leader, prepare)
      propCmds := (); lcs := [0]n; lds := [⊥]n
      acks := [⊥]n; lc := 0
      send (Prepare, nl, lc, nl) to all π - {self}
      acks[L] := (nl, suffix(va, lc))
      lds[self] := lc; nmax := nl
    else:
      state := (follower, state[2])

On (Prepare, nl, lc, n) from L:
  if nmax < nl:
    nmax := nl; state := (follower, prepare)
    suffix := if nl ≥ n; suffix(va, lc) else ()
    send (Promise, nl, np, suffix, lc) to L



acks[a] := (na, suffixa), lds[a] := ld
P := {p in π : acks[p] ≠ ⊥}
if |P| ≥ ((N+1)/2):
  (k, suffix) := max({acks[p]; p in P}) // adopt v
  va := prefix(va, lc) + suffix + propCmds
  lcs[self] := |va|
  propCmds := (); state := (leader, accept)
  for p in π - {self} and lds[p] ≠ ⊥:
    suffix := suffix(va, lds[p])
    send (AcceptSync, nl, suffix, lds[p]) to p

On (Promise, n, np, suffixp, lc) from a
s.t. n = nl and state = (leader, accept):
  lds[a] := ld
  send (AcceptSync, nl, suffix(va, lds[a]), lds[a]) to a
  if lc ≠ 0:
    send (Decide, lc, nl) to a
  
```



choose

Atomic



$$\text{cons}(\{1, 2, 4\}, 2) = \{\{1, 2\}, \{1, 4\}, \{2, 4\}\}$$





```

On (Leader, L, n):
  if n > nl:
    leader := L, nl := n
    if self = L and nl > nmax:
      state := (leader, prepare)
      propCmds := (); las := [0]n; lds := [⊥]n
      acks := [⊥]n; lc := 0
      send (Prepare, nl, lc, nl) to all π - {self}
      acks[L] := (nl, suffix(va, lc}))
      lds[self] := lc; nmax := nl
    else:
      state := (follower, state[2])

On (Prepare, nl, lc, n) from L:
  if nmax < nl:
    nmax := nl; state := (follower, prepare)
    suffix := if nl ≥ n; suffix(va, lc) else ()
    send (Promise, nl, np, suffix, lc) to L

acks[a] := (na, suffixa), lds[a] := ld
P := {p in π : acks[p] ≠ ⊥}
if |P| = [(N+1)/2]:
  (k, suffix) := max({acks[p] : p in P}) // adopt v
  va := prefix(va, ld) + suffix + propCmds;
  las[self] := va
  propCmds := (); state := (leader, accept)
  for p in π - {self} and lds[p] ≠ ⊥:
    suffix := suffix(va, lds[p])
    send (AcceptSync, nl, suffix, lds[p]) to p

On (Promise, n, np, suffixa, ld) from a
s.t. n = nl and state = (leader, accept):
  lds[a] := ld
  send (AcceptSync, nl, suffix(va, lds[a]), lds[a]) to a
  if lc ≠ 0:
    send (Decide, lc, nl) to a
  
```



$$\text{cons}(\{1, 2, 4\}, 2) = \{\{1, 2\}, \{1, 4\}, \{2, 4\}\}$$

CCXC

Consistent Participants

CCXC

```

On (Leader, L, n):
  if n > nl:
    leader := L; nl := n
  if self = L and nl > nmax:
    state := (leader, prepare)
    propCmds = (); las := [0]n; lds := [1]n
    acks := [1]n; lc = 0;
    send (Prepare, nl, lc, nl) to all π - {self}
    acks[L] := (nl, suffix(va, lc}))
    lds[self] := lc; nmax := nl
  else:
    state = (follower, state[2])

On (Prepare, nl, lc, n) from L:
  if nmax < nl:
    nmax := nl; state := (follower, prepare)
    suffix := if nl ≥ n: suffix(va, lc) else ()
    send (Promise, nl, np, suffix, lc) to L

acks[a] := (np, suffixa), lds[a] := ld
P := {p in π : acks[p] ≠ ⊥}
if |P| ≥ ((N+1)/2):
  (k, suffix) := max({acks[p] : p in P}) // adopt v
  va := prefix(va, lc) + suffix + propCmds;
  las[self] := lc
  propCmds := (); state := (leader, accept)
  for p in π - {self} and lds[p] ≠ ⊥:
    sufx := suffix(va, lds[p])
    send (AcceptSync, nl, sufx, lds[p]) to p

On (Promise, n, np, suffixa, ld) from a
s.t. n = nl and state = (leader, accept):
  lds[a] := ld
  send (AcceptSync, nl, suffix(va, lds[a]), lds[a]) to a
  if lc ≠ 0:
    send (Decide, lc, nl) to a
  
```



choose

choose

choose

CCXC

CCXC

CCXC

CCXC

$$\text{cons}(\{1, 2, 4\}, 2) = \{\{1, 2\}, \{1, 4\}, \{2, 4\}\}$$

CCXC

Consistent Participants

XCXC

CCXC

```

On (Leader, L, n):
  if n > nl:
    leader := L, nl := n
  if self = L and nl > nprev:
    state := (leader, prepare)
    propCmds := (); lcs := [0]n; lds := [L]n
    acks := [L]n; lc := 0
    send (Prepare, nl, lc, nl) to all π - {self}
    acks[L] := (nl, suffix(va, lc))
    lds[self] := lc; nprev := nl
  else:
    state := (follower, state[2])

On (Prepare, nl, lc, n) from L:
  if nprev < nl:
    nprev := nl; state := (follower, prepare)
    suffix := if nl ≥ n; suffix(va, lc) else ()
    send (Promise, nl, nl, suffix, lc) to L

acks[a] := (na, suffixa), lds[a] := ld
P := {p in π : acks[p] ≠ ⊥}
if |P| ≥ ((N+1)/2):
  (k, suffix) := max({acks[p] : p in P}) // adopt v
  va := prefix(va, ld) + suffix + propCmds;
  lds[self] := ld
  propCmds := (); state := (leader, accept)
  for p in π - {self} and lds[p] ≠ ⊥:
    suffix := suffix(va, lds[p])
    send (AcceptSync, nl, suffix, lds[p]) to p

On (Promise, n, nl, suffixa, ld) from a
s.t. n = nl and state = (leader, accept):
  lds[a] := ld
  send (AcceptSync, nl, suffix(va, lds[a]), lds[a]) to a
  if lc ≠ 0:
    send (Decide, lc, nl) to a
  
```



choose

choose

choose

CCXC

CCXC

CCXC

CCXC

$$\text{cons}(\{1, 2, 4\}, 2) = \{\{1, 2\}, \{1, 4\}, \{2, 4\}\}$$

CCXC

Consistent Participants

XCXC

CCXC

```

On (Leader, L, n):
  if n > ni:
    leader := L, ni := n
  if self = L and ni > nmax:
    state := (leader, prepare)
    propCmds := (); las := [0]n; lds := [1]n
    acks := [1]n; lc := 0
    send (Prepare, ni, lc, na) to all π - {self}
    acks[L] := (na, suffix(va, la))
    lds[self] := la, nmax := ni
  else:
    state := (follower, state[2])
  
```

```

acks[a] := (na, suffixa), lds[a] := la
P := {p in π : acks[p] ≠ 1}
if |P| ≥ ((N+1)/2):
  (k, suffix) := max({acks[p] : p in P}) // adopt v
  va := prefix(va, la) + suffix + propCmds
  las[self] := va
  propCmds := (); state := (leader, accept)
  for p in π - {self} and lds[p] ≠ 1:
    suffix := suffix(va, lds[p])
    send (AcceptSync, na, suffix, lds[p]) to p
  
```

```

On (Prepare, ni, lc, n) from L:
  if nmax < ni:
    nmax := ni; state := (follower, prepare)
    suffix := if na ≥ n : suffix(va, la) else ()
    send (Promise, ni, na, suffix, la) to L
  
```

```

On (Promise, n, na, suffixa, la) from a
  s.t. n = ni and state = (leader, accept):
    lds[a] := la
    send (AcceptSync, ni, suffix(va, lds[a]), lds[a]) to a
    if lc ≠ 0:
      send (Decide, la, ni) to a
  
```



choose

choose

choose

CCXC

Consistent Winners


CCXC

CCXC


CCXC

$$\text{cons}(\{1, 2, 4\}, 2) = \{\{1, 2\}, \{1, 4\}, \{2, 4\}\}$$

# choose protocols



+




# Discover[i]


Distributed protocols with consensus components



Abstraction




Parameterized verification



Parameterized synthesis

# Parameterized Model Checking Problem (PMCP)



# Parameterized Model Checking Problem (PMCP)

$$\forall n. M(n) \models \phi ?$$

# Parameterized Model Checking Problem (PMCP)

Parameterized system

$\forall n. M(n) \models \phi ?$

Undecidable

# Parameterized Model Checking Problem (PMCP)

Decidable fragments

Communication primitives

Network topology

Specification


# Parameterized Model Checking Problem (PMCP)

Decidable fragments	Broadcast protocols	Guarded protocols
Communication primitives	Broadcasts	Global guards
Network topology	Clique	Clique
Specification	Safety	Safety + Liveness

[Esparza et al. 1999]

[EmersonKahlon 2000]

# choose protocols



Not subsumed by existing decidability results

Key result:

PMCP is decidable for the **choose** model w.r.t. safety properties.

## Decidability of PMCP for Guarded Broadcast (GB) protocols

“partially synchronous round-based protocols”

## Simulation equivalence b/w GB protocols and choose protocols

Given **choose** protocol  $M_l$ , can construct a GB protocol  $M_h \simeq M_l$ :

$$\forall n. M_h(n) \models \phi \leftrightarrow M_l(n) \models \phi$$

## Cut-offs $c$ for PMCP for GB protocols

$$M_h(c) \models \phi \leftrightarrow \forall n. M_h(n) \models \phi$$

## Decidability of PMCP for Guarded Broadcast (GB) protocols

“partially synchronous round-based protocols”

Reduction to  
well-structured  
transition systems

## Simulation equivalence b/w GB protocols and choose protocols

Given **choose** protocol  $M_l$ , can construct a GB protocol  $M_h \simeq M_l$ :

$$\forall n. M_h(n) \models \phi \leftrightarrow M_l(n) \models \phi$$

Predicate and  
counter abstraction

## Cut-offs $c$ for PMCP for GB protocols

$$M_h(c) \models \phi \leftrightarrow \forall n. M_h(n) \models \phi$$

Analysis of model  
checking algorithm

$$M_l(c) \models \phi$$

### Decidability of PMCP for Guarded Broadcast (GB) protocols

“partially synchronous round-based protocols”

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$$M_l(c) \models \phi$$



$$M_h(c) \models \phi$$



$$\forall n. M_h(n) \models \phi$$

## Decidability of PMCP for Guarded Broadcast (GB) protocols

“partially synchronous round-based protocols”

## Simulation equivalence b/w GB protocols and choose protocols

Given **choose** protocol  $M_L$ , can construct a GB protocol  $M_h \simeq M_L$ :

$$\forall n. M_h(n) \models \phi \leftrightarrow M_L(n) \models \phi$$

## Cut-offs $c$ for PMCP for GB protocols

$$M_h(c) \models \phi \leftrightarrow \forall n. M_h(n) \models \phi$$

$$M_L(c) \models \phi$$



$$M_h(c) \models \phi$$



$$\forall n. M_h(n) \models \phi$$




$$\forall n. M_L(n) \models \phi$$

# Discover[i]


Distributed protocols with consensus components



Abstraction



Parameterized verification



Parameterized synthesis

Specification  
 $\phi$

Process FSM  
 $P$

Parameterized verification

Parameterized synthesis

Specification  
 $\phi$

Process FSM  
 $P$



Parameterized verification

Success



$\forall n. M(n) \models \phi$

Parameterized synthesis



$M(n) = P_1 \parallel \dots \parallel P_n$





$$M(n) = P_1 \parallel \dots \parallel P_n$$



$$M(n) = P_1 \parallel \dots \parallel P_n$$




$$M(n) = P_1 \parallel \dots \parallel P_n$$




$$M(n) = P_1 \parallel \dots \parallel P_n$$

# Fixed n: Counterexample-guided inductive synthesis


[Alur et al, 2014, 2015]



Arbitrary n: Use cut-off **c**!



Arbitrary n: Use cut-off **c**!




Benchmark	#Local Vars	#Locations	Cut-off	#Iterations	Time(s)
Chubby application	3	9	2	7	4.76
Smoke detector (SD)	7	7	3	49	128.4
SD with reset	7	7	3	31	117.2
SD with 2 <b>choose's</b>	8	8	3	30	144.4
SATS	17	14	5	6	287.6

# Discover[i]


Distributed protocols with consensus components



Abstraction



Parameterized verification



Parameterized synthesis

# Discover[i]


Distributed protocols with components

Failures




Abstractions

Liveness



Parameterized verification

Other components



Parameterized synthesis