Lazy-CFR: fast and near-optimal regret minimization for extensive games with imperfect information

  • Yichi Zhou ,
  • Tongzheng Ren ,
  • Dong Yan ,
  • Jialian Li ,
  • Jun Zhu

International Conference on Learning Representations (ICLR) |

Counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) methods are effective for solving twoplayer zero-sum extensive games with imperfect information. However, the vanilla CFR has to traverse the whole game tree in each round, which is time-consuming in large-scale games. In this paper, we present Lazy-CFR, a CFR algorithm that adopts a lazy update strategy to avoid traversing the whole game tree in each round. We prove that the regret of Lazy-CFR is almost the same as the regret of the vanilla CFR and only needs to visit a small portion of the game tree. Thus, Lazy-CFR is provably faster than CFR. Empirical results consistently show that Lazy-CFR is fast in practice.